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*State Dept
Working paper*

Feb 10/55

Disarmament Questions

(1) Should further review of US disarmament policies be conducted under the direction of a person of outstanding qualifications, free to concentrate on disarmament and to devote a substantial part of his time to these matters for at least a year? In carrying out such review, each concerned agency (State, Defense, AEC) would furnish an advisor to such individual and stand ready to undertake whatever technical or other studies may be determined to be necessary?

(2) Should the U.S. be prepared to accept an effective program for the control of atomic materials under adequate safeguards without conditioning such a program on agreement for conventional disarmament?

(3) Should the U.S. be prepared to undertake limited approaches to disarmament, without agreement as to further or resulting steps, in the hope that such limited approaches might serve to --

a. test, by experience, systems of inspection or other safeguards;

b. lay a basis for further progress toward disarmament.

(4) Is there more risk to US survival in:

a. continuing present armament trends, while relying on our safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack? or

b. seeking to negotiate a disarmament program, which might include the undertaking by the US at first of some limited approach?

(5) What should be the US position in the UN, pending an approved revision of policy?

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State Dept. review completed